Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2015

Roger Bryner, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Utah
Department of Public Safety, Driver Liscense Division,
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bryner vs. Driver Liscence Division, No. 20150564 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3275

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20150564-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROGER BRYNER,
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
V.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,
Respondent/ Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

OPENING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
Judge Andrew H. Stone

BRENT A. BURNETT (4003)
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. 0. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Telephone: (801) 366-0533
Attorney for Respondent/ Appellant/
Cross-Appellee
Roger Bryner
PO Box 1082
Clearfield, Utah 84089
Petitioner/ Appellee/Cross Appellant

FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COLi ·

NOV 12 20i5

Case No. 20150564-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROGER BRYNER,
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appel Iant,
V.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

OPENING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
Judge Andrew H. Stone

BRENT A. BURNETT (4003)
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. 0. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Telephone: (801) 366-0533
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant/
Cross-Appellee
Roger Bryner
PO Box 1082
Clearfield, Utah 84089
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross Appellant

COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO RULE 24(f)(l)(C)
I hereby certify that the Brief of Respondent/Appe llant' Cross-Appellee contains
2,233 words, including head ings, footnotes, and quotations, but excluding the Table of
Contents, Table of A uthorities, and the Addendum.
I have relied upon the word count of the word processing system, Wordperfect XS ,
used to prepare this brief. The font used is T imes New Roman, 13 point.
Certified this

/ Z

)II
day of November, 2015 .

Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel fo r Defendant/ Appellant/
Cross-Appellee

LIST OF ALL PARTIES
v;f)

To the best of Respondent's knowledge, all interested parties appear in the caption
of this Brief.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
~

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................................... 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL ...................................... I
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE ............................................ 2
STA TEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 3
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ..................................... 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................. 6
ARGUMENT ........................................................... 6
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY NOT HOLDING A TRIAL DE NOVO
ASREQUIREDBYUTAHLAW .......................................... 6
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 9
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................ 10
Addendum A - Order (R. 585-87)
Addendum B - Ruling (R. 640-41)

-1-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestzy, 907 P .2d 1142 (Utah 1995) .............. 9
Black v. Black, 2008 UT App 465, 199 P.3d 371 ............................... 2
Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ................ 8, 9
Christensen v. Rolfe, 2014 UT App 223, 336 P.3d 40 ........................... 9
Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ................... 7-8, 9
STATUTES and RULES

Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-402 (West Supp. 2014) ......................... 2-3, 6, 7
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103 (West Supp. 2014) ............................... 1

-11-

Cv

Case No. 20150564-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROGER BRYNER,
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
V.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

OPENING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code
.;

Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2014).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
Roger Bryner sought judicial review of the informal administrative proceeding that
resulted in the suspension of his driver's license. Instead of holding a trial de novo, the
district court reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence presented at the

~

administrative proceeding and if proper notice had been given. The court remanded for a
new administrative proceeding with instructions that the agency give proper notice and
consider evidence of the outstanding warrant against Bryner. Did the trial court err in

reviewing the informal administrative decision instead of conducting a trial de novo as
required by Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-402 (West Supp. 2014)?

ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue
was raised by the Driver License Division (Division) before the trial judge. R. 460-62.
The trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correction of error. Black v.
Black, 2008 UT App 465, ~ 7, 199 P.3d 371.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402 (West Supp. 2014) Judicial review -- Informal
adjudicative proceedings
(l)(a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile
courts have jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating to:
(i) the removal or placement of children in state custody;
(ii) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) as determined
administratively under Section 78A-6-1106; and

(iii) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by the Division of Child and
Family Services, after an evidentiary hearing.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as
provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision,
in the county where the petitioner resides or maintains the petitioner's principal place of
business.
(2)(a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall
be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency;
2

(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, together with a
copy, summary, or brief description of the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal adjudicative
proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief.

~

(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3)(a) The court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and
any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Roger Bryner filed this petition for judicial review of an informal administrative
proceeding in which his driver's license was suspended. R. 227-35.
Instead of holding a trial de novo, the trial judge reviewed the informal
administrative proceeding. The judge held that he had insufficient information as to what
evidence was presented in the informal proceeding. R. 586-87. The trial judge therefore

~

remanded this action for the Division to consider further evidence in a new informal
proceeding. R. 587. The trial judge also remanded this action to the Division to give
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Bryner new notice in lieu of the administrative notice the trial judge held to be
inadequate. R. 586-87.
The Court rejects the Division's position that the Court should either
substitute. its own judgment for the Division's exercise of discretion or defer
to the Division's decision when it is unclear the Division exercised its
discretion with the actual facts before it. The statute plainly grants the
Division discretion, but the parties' factual submissions do not indicate that
the Division even knew of a warrant, as opposed to a citation, being issued
against Petitioner. In such case, the alternative remedy of remand is
appropriate.
After reviewing the briefs and arguments and evidence submitted in
this proceeding, the Court finds the evidence is insufficient to determine
whether the Division was notified by a Court of and considered the
existence of an outstanding warrant against the Petitioner, as required under
Utah Code§ 53-3-221(3)(a). The submissions of the parties here indicate
that Petitioner was informed of an outstanding citation, as opposed to the
existence of a warrant. Properly framing the issue by notice is important for
two reasons: First, it informs the Petitioner of the actual basis for the
proposed administrative action, and second, it ensures that the Division
made its decision based on the actual facts that potentially justify its action.
R. 586-87.
The trial court entered its final order on June 18, 2015. R. 585-87. The Division
timely filed its notice of appeal on June 29, 2015. R. 590-92. Bryner filed a postjudgment motion on June 30, 2015, R. 595-99, that was denied by the trial court on
August 13, 2015. R. 640-41. Bryner filed his cross notice of appeal on September 4,
2015. R. 643. The Division filed its amended notice of appeal on September 9, 2015. R.
651-52.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

On May 12, 2014, Bryner was found guilty of three infraction charges in Holladay
Justice Court, case number 131000539. R. 276-77. The Holladay Justice Court later
affirmed that finding in a subsequent hearing after denying Bryner's motion to arrest
judgment on June 4, 2012. R. 278-79. Two of the infractions were for traffic violations.
R. 279.

On July 30 2014, the Holladay Justice Court issued a warrant for Bryner for his
failure to appear at the sentencing hearing. R. 285. During that same hearing, the Justice
~

Court also stated for the record that it would not sentence Bryner until he appeared in
person. R. 284-85. 1
That same day, the Justice Court electronically notified the Division concerning
the failure to appear at the sentencing hearing. R. 515-18. The next day the Division
issued a notice of suspension that informed Bryner his driving privilege would be
suspended as of August 21, 2014. R. 508. The notice of suspension also informed
Bryner that he could avoid the suspension by clearing the underlying issue with the

,.J

Holladay Justice Court. Id.
The letter also informed Bryner that he could request a hearing ~ith the Division.
Id. On August 14, 2014, the Division held a hearing regarding Bryner's impending

1

At the time this matter was heard in the trial court, the warrant was still active
and had not been recalled by the Justice Court. R. 285-88.
5

suspension. The hearing officer sustained the suspension. R. 510. Bryner's driving
privileges were suspended on August 21, 2104.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trial courts review challenged informal administrative proceedings by trial de
novo. Such trials de novo correct any procedural due process errors that might have
occurred. In-this action, the trial judge failed to conduct a trial de novo. Instead he
reviewed the informal record and remanded this matter for the Division to correct a notice
that was deemed inadequate and to consider further evidence. The trial judge did not
have the authority to review the informal adjudicative proceeding other than by trial de
novo.

. ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY NOT HOLDING A TRIAL DE
NOVO AS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW
Bryner had his driver's license suspended by an informal administrative
proceeding. Bryner filed his petition for judicial review with the trial court. Judicial
review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is done by trial de novo. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G4-402(l)(a) (West Supp. 2014) ("The district courts have jurisdiction to review by
trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings").
The trial judge erred by not conducting a trial de novo.
Instead, the trial judge remanded this proceeding to the Division to correct errors
the trial judge found had occurred in the informal administrative proceeding. The trial
6

judge erroneously performed a review of the administrative proceeding instead of
~

conducting the requisite trial de novo.
Section 402 gives the trial court jurisdiction to review informal adjudicative
proceedings by trial de novo. This requires that "the district court's review of informal
adjudicative proceedings be accomplished by holding a new trial, not just by reviewing an
informal record." Cordova v. Blackstock: 861 P.2d 449,451 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In
Cordova, the district court did not conduct a new trial. Instead, the district court vacated
the informal adjudicative decision for violating the residuum rule by relying solely on
inadmissable hearsay.
This Court reversed, holding that the district court should have held a new trial and
not reviewed the informal record. Id. The trial judge in this appeal committed the same
error as did the district court in Cordova. Instead of determining whether Bryner' s
driver's license should be suspended based on the evidence before him, the trial judge
remanded the matter for the agency to conduct a new hearing. He did this not because of
any concern with the evidence before him, but because he was unsure as to what evidence

~

had been presented at the informal proceeding. R. 586. He did not have jurisdiction to
review the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the administrative action. It was the
trial judge's duty, as stated in Cordova, to conduct a trial de novo and decide based on the
evidence he received. The trial de novo would permit the trial judge to.assure himself
that there was adequate evidence to support the suspension of Bryner' s driver's license.

7

Trials de novo are meant to correct any deficiencies that "might arise ·by nature of
the informality of the agency hearing." Id. "A simple examination of the agency's
informal record by the district court would not provide the opportunity to correct any ·
deficiencies and prejudice as would a trial." Id. The trial judge did not have jurisdiction
to review alleged procedural errors of the informal proceedings and claims of inadequate
evidence being presented. Any such errors were to be corrected by conducting a trial de
,,..

~

novo.
Another reason for a trial de novo is to prepare an adequate record for further
judicial review. Id. at 451-52. This Court has noted that informal proceedings are less
likely to result in an adequate record. Id. at 452. By his actions the trial judge failed to
provide this Court with an adequate record to consider the merits of the decision to
suspend Bryner's license.
Bryner was not prejudiced by any alleged procedural due process errors committed
in the informal proceeding. The absolute right to a trial de novo before the trial court is
meant to correct any such errors. Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) (allegedly defective notice in the informal proceeding was cured by trial
de novo in the district court). And yet the trial judge remanded, in part, this matter
expressly for the Division to correct an allegedly defective notice. R. 5 86-87. The trial
de novo that the trial court refused to hold was meant to correct such an error.

8

The Utah Supreme Court has expressly approved of this Court's decisions in
Cordova and Brinkerhoff.
Instead, we note with approval and adopt the rule previously used in
two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals establishing the right to a
new trial without deference to the determinations of an informal
administrative proceeding. This rule guarantees the district court the
opportunity to correct any deficiencies that may arise because of the
informal nature of administrative proceedings and provides an adequate
record for future review.
Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry. 907 P.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Utah 1995) (citations
omitted).
This Court's recent decision in Christensen v. Rolfe, 2014 UT App 223, 336 P.3d
40 (informal driver's license proceedings are only reviewed by trial de novo and not by
review of the administrative proceeding), was also presented to the trial court. R. 460,
541, 681, 706. Instead of following Christensen, the trial court reviewed the informal
proceeding rather than conducting a .~rial de novo, as had the courts reversed in
.
.
Christensen. The trial ~ourt's decision, as the ·decisions of the trial courts in Christensen,
should be reversed and this matter remanded for a trial de novo.

CONCLUSION
The trial judge should have reviewed the challenged informal administrative
proceeding by trial de novo. Instead, he reviewed the informal proceeding's record and
remanded for the Division to c·orrect errors perceived by the trial judge. The trial court's

9

decision should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the trial court for trial de
novo.
Respectfully submitted this

/2..

;t/

day of November, 2015.

BRENT A . BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent/ Appellant
Cross-Appellee
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KEVIN BOLANDER, Assistant Attorney General (11511)
MARCUS R. YOCKEY, Assistant Attorney General ( 14850)
SEAN D. REYES, Attorney General (7969)
Attorneys for Utah Depa11ment of Public Safety
4501 South 2700 West, PO Box 141775
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1775
Telephone: (801) 965-4466
Facsimile: (80 I) 965-4608
Email: kbolander@utah.gov

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Roger Bryner,

ORDER [P11apased]

Petitioner,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,

Case No. 140906147
Judge Andrew H. Stone

Respondent.

The Court has made changes to the proposed order submitted by Respondent, after reviewing
Petitioner's objections. The Court's additions are in bold and the Court's deletions appear as
strike-th roughs.
This matter came before the Court in a hearing on May 11, 2015. There were several
motions pending before the Court, including cross-motions for summary judgment. The Petitioner
Roger Bryner represented himself and appeared by telephone. The Utah Driver License Division
("'Division") was represented by Kevin Bolander, Assistant Attorney General.
The parties briefed, among other arguments, whether the Petitioner's driving privilege may

00585
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be suspended pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 53-3-22 I (3 ). The Petitioner argues that during
the administrative proceedings, the Division did not consider the existence of an outstanding
warrant against him, giving the Division no authority to suspend his driving privilege because the
agency decision was based on a different reason for suspension. The Division argues the Court
cannot review the administrative record of the informal proceeding, but instead should rule based on
the arguments and evidence the parties submit during de novo review of the final agency action. The
Division also argues any procedural defects with its administrative proceedings are cured by de
novo review, therefore the Court may consider argument regarding whether suspension is warranted
pursuant to Section 53-3-221 (3).
The Court rejects the Division's position that the Court should either substitute its own
judgment for tbe Division's exercise of discretion or defer to the Division's decision when it is
unclear the Division exercised its discretion with the actual facts before it. The statute plainly
grants the Division discretion, but the parties' factual submissions do not indicate that the
Division even knew of a warrant, as opposed to a citation, being issued against Petitioner. In
such case, the alternative remedy of remand is appropriate.

After reviewing the briefs and arguments and evidence submitted in this proceeding, the
Comt finds the evidence eoataiRed iR the administrative reeorcl is insufficient to determine whether
the Division was notified by a Court of and considered the existence of an outstanding warrant
against the Petitioner, as required under Utah Code§ 53-3-221(3)(a). lnstead of further
proeeediflgs Vlith this matter Ofl trial de novo, the The submissions of the parties here indicate
that Petitioner was informed of an outstanding citation, as opposed to the existence of a
warrant. Properly framing the issue by notice is important for two reasons: First, it informs
00586
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the Petitioner of the actual basis for the proposed administrative action, and second, it ensures
that the Division made its decision based on the actual facts that potentially justify its action.
The Court therefore remands this matter to the Division pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63G4-404(I )(b )(v), and instructs the Division to consider the existence of the outstanding warrant
against the Petitioner when determining whether to suspend his driving privilege.
End of Document-Court Approva] Appears at Top of This Page

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 29 rd day of May, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
[PROPOSED] was sent by email to:
Roger Bryner
roger.bryner@yahoo.com
PO Box 1082
Clearfield, Utah 84089

Bolander
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ADDENDUM ''B"

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LA.KE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,
Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION,
Defendant.

Case No: 140906147
Judge: ANDREW H STONE
August 13, 2015
Date:

Before the Court is Plaintiff Bryner's Motion re Findings of Fact and Law on
Notification or Warrant by Justice Court and Maintaining Jurisdiction After Remand.
This is an appeal of a a decision by the Utah Department of Public Safety, Drivers'
License Division (Division) to suspend Petitioner's driver's license. Petitioner
failed to appear at a Justice Court proceeding, and a warrant was issued.
Subsequently, the Division sent him notice of an intent to suspend his driver's license
due to the existence of a citation.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, it was undisputed that the notice provided by
the Division referred to a citation, and likewise undisputed that a warrant, and not a
citation, was issued by the Justice Court. Based on that the Court remanded the matter
to the Division to expressly consider the question with regard to the existence of a
warrant, not as to a citation. See Order dated June 18, 2015, herein. That Order
contemplates no further action by this Court until the agency completes its action. No
further findings are necessary. Plaintiff 1 s Motion for Findings,etc. is therefore
denied.

Date:

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document
case 140906147 by the method and on the date specified.
MAIL:

ROGER BRYNER PO BOX 1082 CLEARFIELD 1 UT 84089

MAIL:

KEVIN L BOLANDER 5272 S COLLEGE DR STE 200 MURRAY
08/13/2015

people for

UT 84123

/s/ MICHELLE ADAMS

Date:

Printed: 08/13/15 10:41:22
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